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Ernie Brown checks his watch with annoyance. As the youngest and brightest sales 
representative in his company, he's been sent to Telco Mfg. in Mexico City, to pitch 
his company's newest line of equipment. He's been waiting mote than forty minutes 
to meet with Javier Arroyo-one of Telco's most influential managers and also the 
petson responsible for authorizing capital purchases at the Mexico City facility-to 
free himself up from other appointments. Finally, Ernie is led back to Senor Arroyo's 
office. The conversation begins with "small talk"-mostly questions about Ernie's 
activities since arriving in Mexico City. Upon learning that Ernie had not seen any 
of the local sights, Senor Arroyo offers to take him sightseeing latet that afternoon. 
Ernie responds with a polite, yet firm rejection, adding that this is a business trip 
and that his boss expects him back in Los Angeles the following day. Senor Arroyo 
continues to talk about famous buildings in Mexico City and the history ofthe archi­
tecture. Exaspetated at the slow pace, Ernie interrupts him, asking for a tour of the 
plant so that he can get a better sense of how the new equipment might fit in and 
indicating his strong desire to discuss the new line he's touting. Senor Arroyo side­
steps the request by asking about Ernie's family. But Ernie will not be put off and 
insists on moving on to the reason for his visit. At this point, Senor Arroyo gives in 
and begins to answer Ernie's questions. Later, while touring the plant facilities, 
Ernie's cell phone rings. He answers it, and as he talks he notices Senor Arroyo's irri­
tation. Ernie terminates the call, saying, "I'll get back to you on that tomorrow; my 
host is giving me the evil eye." Back in Senor Arroyo's office, Ernie pulls out his lap­
top and presentation materials. "Now, I'd like to show you something. This is our 
new line of equipment. I've got some data on its performance characteristics in a 
plant setting like yours. Let's take a look." 
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Negotiating a deal can be rough sailing in one's own country. Negotiators, such 
as Ernie in the opening vignette, often sail uncharted waters when negotiating 
cross-culturally. Cultural factors can complicate, prolong, and frustrate negotia­
tions; and finding accurate, useful information can be a challenge. Much of the 
information that is available to an expanding corps of international managers 
about negotiating behaviors in countries around the world is descriptive. l Nego­
tiators may find themselves relying on very basic lists of do sand don'ts, 2 which 
may not always contain tips relevant to negotiating. Moreover, items included 
in such lists are generally not comparable across countries. Empirical work that 
systematically compares variations across a range of countries is scarce. 3 An exam­
ple of the types of common information available to a negotiator for Mexico is 
presented in Table 10.1. What the table makes clear is the lack of information 
on many dimensions, the stereotypical nature ofwhat is available, and the contra­
dictions that exist-without explanation-between widely available sources. In 
this era of increased global cooperation, it is imperative that negotiators be 
equipped with a better understanding of the orientations they might expect at 
the negotiation table.4 
A comprehensive framework having potential to yield comparable information 
across countries on 12 negotiating tendencies was proposed 20 years ago by 
Stephen E. Weiss and William Stripp.5 The framework was conceptual, with 
loosely defined dimensions. The intent was simply to sensitize researchers and 
practitioners to possible culturally based differences in negotiation attitudes, 
behaviors, and contexts.6 To use the framework in empirical work it was necessary 
to define each dimension more precisely, which led us to review the extensive 
bodies of negotiation and cross-cultural research that have built up over the last 
two decades. Based on our review, we redefined 9 of the original 12 dimensions. 
Figure 10.1 comprises our reinterpretation of the framework. 
THE NEGOTIATION ORIENTATIONS FRAMEWORK: 
DEFINING THE DIMENSIONS 
Refinements in the definition of the 12 dimensions in the framework are pre­
sented below. Precise definitions provide the basis of good measurement and the 
means by which subsequent research findings can be compared and synthesized? 
Basic Concept of Negotiation: Distributive versus Integrative 
Basic Concept of Negotiation refers to how each party views the negotiating 
process. A bipolar continuum, with distributive bargaining and integrative 
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Table 10.1 
Conventional Wisdom about Negotiation in Mexico and the United States 
Dimension Mexico United States 




Mexicans have a win-win 
attitude. Hard bargainers. 
Long, vigorous discussions. 
Problem solving. Look for 
mutual gains, whenever 
possible. 
Most Significant Type 
of Issue: Task or 
Relationship 
Mexicans are relationship 
oriented. 
Establish rapport quickly 
before "getting down to 
business." Personal 
relationships are ignored 
when discussing issues. 
Selection of 
Negotiators: Abilities or 
Status 
Expertise is less important 
than fitting in with the 
group. 
Negotiators have relevant 
skills and expertise. 




Mexicans pursue individual 
goals, personal recognition. 





pendent or Majority 
Rule 
DeciSion-making authority 
is vested in a few at the top. 




Time: Monochronie or 
Polychronie 
Do not expect punctuality. 
Easy-going business atmos­
phere. Quick decisions 
perceived as concessions. 
Mexicans take time to reach 
decisions. 
Meetings begin and end 
promptly. Agenda driven. 
Action oriented. Decisions 
are reached by the end of 
the meeting. 
Risk-Taking Propen­
sity: Risk Averse or Risk 
Tolerant 
Mexican negotiators avoid 
risk. 
Short-term oriented; focus 
on immediate gains. 
Basis of Trust: External 
or Internal 
Trust based on personal 
relationships. 
Heavy reliance on the 
legal system. Lawyers 
involved from start to 
finish. 
Concern with Protocol: 
Formal or Informal 
Mexicans value formality; 
follow established etiquette. 
Do not like formality in 
business interaction. 
StyleofConununica­
tion: Low Context or 
High Context 
Mexicans avoid direct 
answers. 
Direct and to the point. 
(continued) 
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Table 10.1 (continued) 
Dimension Mexico United States 
Nature of Persuasion: 
Factual-Inductive or 
Affective 
Truth is based on feelings. 
Emotional arguments are 
more effective than logic. 
Deals are evaluated on 
their technical merits. 
Form ofAgreement: 
Explicit Contract or 
Implicit Agreement 
Woreis are not a binding 
commitment to action. 
Relationships ensure follow-
through. 
Contracts are emphasized, 
along with the fine points 
of an agreement. 
Sources: Recommendations are drawn from a variety of sources including Business Mexico, 2002; Cul­
rureGrams World Edition 2007; Elashmawi, 2001; Fisher & Uty, 1991; Hall & Hall, 1990; Hampden­
Turner & Trompenaars, 2000; Investor's Business Daily, 2004; Kras, 1989; Moran & Stripp, 1991; and 
Morrison, Conaway, & Borden, 1994. 
problem solving as endpoints, is consistent with R.E. Walton and Robert B. 
McKersie.8 
Distributive Perspective 
The assumption underlying distributive bargaining strategies is that one party 
gains at the expense of the other. Negotiators fitting this profile believe that there 
will be one winner and one loser,9 assume that their interests directly conflict with 
those of the other party, 10 seek to meet only their own goals or interests in order 
to maximize the benefit for their side, 11 and focus on the need for the other party 
to concede. 12 The prevailing belief is "what is good for the other party must be 
bad for us.,,13 
Integrative Perspective 
The assumption underlying integrative bargaining strategies is that there is 
opportunity for both parties to gain from a negotiated agreement because they 
place different values on the issues being negotiated and can find effective trade­
offs by conceding less important issues to gain on more important ones. Integra­
tive negotiation involves both cooperation to expand the pie and competition to 
divide the pie between the two parties. 14 Negotiators fitting this profile believe 
that win-win solutions can be generated,15 employ a problem-solving approach 
to develop solutions that expand the size of the rewards available to everyone, 16 
and attempt to understand the underlying issues and their relative importance 
to both parties in order to capitalize on the different interests of both parties 
and to find effective trade-offs. 17 
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Figure 10.1 
The Negotiation Orientations Framework 
Dimensions	 Negotiator's Profile 
1.	 Basic Concept of Negotiation 
2.	 Most Significant Type of 
Issue 
3.	 Selection of Negotiators 
4.	 Influence of Individual 
Aspirations 
5.	 Internal Decision-Making 
Process 
6.	 Orientation toward Time 
7.	 Risk-Taking Propensity 
8.	 Basis of Trust 
9.	 Concern with Protocol 
10. Style of Communication 
11. Nature of Persuasion 
12. Fonn of Agreement 
Distributive Integrative 




Independent Majority Rule 
Monochronic Polychronic
._-_ .. _---_ .. _._ ... _.-._ .. _.. _...._._------.,._ ... _.,_ ..------_ .. _.. _""---­
Risk-averse Risk-tolerant 




---------_._---------------------- ... ----_ ..---------------'" 
Factual-inductive Affective 
Explicit Implicit 
Most Significant Type of Issue: Task versus Relationship 
Most Significant Type of Issue refers to the types of issues negotiators spend 
more time discussing. Although negotiators may be concerned with both task 
and relationship in a negotiation, they are likely to emphasize one over the 
other. IS 
Task 
Negotiators with a task frame focus on specific issues having to do with the 
project at hand and view these issues as being external to the relationship. 19 Nego­
tiators who believe that task issues are more important tend to focus the entire 
negotiation on the deal being discussed and not so much on the people involved 
in the discussions.2o 
Relationship 
Negotiators with a relationship frame view task-related issues as being insepa­
rable from the relationship. They devote time to activities that build trust and 
friendship between the members, believing that this provides a foundation for 
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addressing task issues?! Negotiators who believe that the relationship is primary 
tend to focus the entire negotiation on the people involved in the discussions 
and not so much on the deal being discussed. 22 
Selection ofNegotiators: Abilities versus Status 
Selection of Negotiators refers to the criteria used to select members of the 
negotiating team. Achievement-based people evaluate and relate to others based 
on what they have accomplished; status-based people evaluate and relate to others 
based on who they are.23 
Abilities 
People with an achievement-based view believe members ofa negotiating team 
should be selected because they possess certain job-related skills or because they 
have expertise that will be useful during the course of the negotiations.24 Exam­
ples of relevant skills or expertise include education, technical or scientific knowl­
edge, legal training, vocational achievement, negotiating experience, or language 
fluency. 
Status 
People with a status-based view believe members of a negotiating team should 
be selected because of who they are and whom they know. Examples of relevant 
characteristics include family background, influential connections, seniority, age, 
or gender.25 Negotiators from status-based cultures may be senior, high-ranking 
officials, who wield considerable influence in their organizations26 and who may 
also command great respect in the community at large.27 
Influence of Individual Aspirations: Individualist versus Collectivist 
Influence of Individual Aspirations refers to the emphasis negotiators plac~ on 
the achievement of individual goals and the need for individual recognition. 
Individualist 
Harry C. Triandis defines individualists as people who see themselves as loosely 
linked to and independent ofothers. 28 They are motivated primarily by their own 
preferences, needs, and rights, atld they give priority to their personal goals. From 
this, we can describe individualist negotiators as being emotionally independent 
from the organization to which they belong and as striving to achieve outcomes 
that are in their own best interests. They may also keep the organization's interests 
and goals in mind, but will do so because they expect personal reward atld recog­
nition for their decisions.29 
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Collectivist 
Triandis defines collectivists as people who see themselves as closely linked to 
and pans ofgroups ofco-workers or a company, for example.3D They give priority 
to the goals of the collective. From this, we can describe collectivist negotiators as 
strongly identifying with and being loyal to their organizations; consequently, 
they may strive to achieve outcomes that are in the organization's best interest 
and may do so with no expectation of personal recognition or gain. The negotiat­
ing team may assume joint responsibility and/or receive joint recognition for 
actions taken or decisions made.31 
Internal Decision-Making Process: Independent versus Majority Rule 
Internal Decision-Making Process refers to the manner in which a negotiating 
team reaches decisions. Jeanne M. Brett identifies a range of decision-making 
behaviors, where either one person on the team has the authority to make the 
decision or a large proportion of the team's members must agree to a particular 
decision. 32 
Independent 
Leaders or other influential individuals on the negotiating team may make deci­
sions independently without input from others on the team.33 
Majority Rule 
Decision-making power is delegated to the entire team. The team leader seeks 
input and support from team members and listens to their advice. 
Orientation toward Time: Monochronic versus Polychronic 
Orientation toward Time refers to the value that negotiators place on time. 
Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall defined two culturally derived concepts 
of time that are important to international business.34 
Monochronic 
People whose orientation toward time is monochronic pay attention to and 
handle tasks one at a time, plan and schedule their activities, and set agendas 
and adhere to them. Monochronic negotiators believe that issues in a negotiation 
should be resolved effectively within the allotted time frame. They believe that 
time is money.35 
Polychronic 
People whose orientation toward time is polychronic handle several tasks 
simultaneously rather than in scheduled succession. Polychronic people do not 
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expect human activities to proceed like clockwork. Consequently, scheduling is 
approximate rather than specific, and delays do not have the negative associations 
found in monochronic cultures. Negotiators from polychronic cultures believe 
that taking the time to get to know their counterparts and building a relationship 
is more important than adhering to a schedule, The actual clock time spent dis­
cussing and resolving issues is of minor importance.36 
Risk-Taking Propensity: Risk Averse versus Risk Tolerant 
This dimension refers to negotiators' willingness to take risks. 
Risk Averse 
Risk-averse negotiators are hesitant to proceed with proposals that may have 
unknowns andlor contingencies associated with them.37 Risk-averse negotiators 
will take steps to avoid the risk of failing to come to an agreement.38 Conse­
quently, they may be more likely to make concessions in order to avoid the risk 
of I:raJ'I'mg to come to an agreement. 39 
Risk Tolerant 
Risk-tolerant negotiators adopt a perspective that there is a level of acceptable 
risk that should be taken in a negotiation. They are interested in reducing risk, 
rather than avoiding it altogether. Risk-tolerant negotiators are willing to proceed 
with proposals that may have unknowns andlor contingencies associated with 
them.40 Risk-tolerant negotiators show greater willingness to run the risk of fail­
ing to come to an agreement. 41 They accept the possibility that they may need 
to walk away from the table without a deal; hence, they are less likely to make 
, 42
concessIOns. 
Basis of Trust: External to the Parties versus Internal to the Relationship 
Trust is one party's belief that the other party will take action to honor agree­
ments that have been reached.43 In all countries, trust provides the foundation 
upon which both parties to a negotiation can work together; however, negotiators 
from some countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations because 
there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to back it up, while negotiators 
from other countries trust that the other party will fulfill its obligations because of 
the relationship that exists between them. 
External to the Parties 
Negotiators with this viewpoint trust the other party because a contract has 
been negotiated and agreed to, which can be litigated and enforced.44 The legal 
system and governmental agencies are viewed as providing an adequate, reliable, 
and effective underpinning for commercial transactions. A partner will honor 
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the terms of the contract because the legal system will impose sanctions otherwise. 
The written word is binding; a deal is a deal.45 In this context, a trustworthy part­
ner is one who complies with the law. 
Internal to the Relationship 
Negotiators with this frame trust the other party because they have invested in a 
relationship that has been built up over time, and they believe that the other party 
is committed to it. The relationship between the parties is what matters; the con­
tract is simply a symbol of the bond between the parties who drafted it.46 A trust­
worthy partner is one who strives to maintain the relationship, possibly by 
modifYing an existing contract to reflect new developments.47 
Concern with Protocol: Formal versus Informal 
Concern with Protocol has to do with the importance placed on rules for 
acce.ratable self-presentation and social behavior. It corresponds to Pertti]. Pel­
to'S 8 characterization of tight and loose cultures, which we use to define the 
dimension more fully. 
Ponnal 
Negotiators with a high concern for protocol will adhere to strict and detailed 
rules that govern personal and professional conduct, negotiating procedures, as 
well as the hospitality extended to negotiators from the other side. Rules gov­
erning acceptable behavior might include dress codes, use of titles, and seating 
arrangements.49 Negotiators believe that there is a limited range of appropriate 
behaviors, and there is strong agreement on the team about what constitutes cor­
rect action. 
Infonnal 
Negotiators with a relatively low concern for protocol adhere to a much 
smaller, more loosely defined set of rules. Team members may believe there are 
multiple ways to behave appropriately in a particular situation and may even have 
conflicting ideas about what is appropriate. 
Style of Communication: High Context versus Low Context 
This dimension refers to the degree to which people rely on verbal statements 
to communicate their primary message. Two culturally derived styles of commu­
nication are important to international business. 50 
Low Context 
Low-context communicators believe that clarity is critical for effective commu­
nication, and they perceive direct requests to be the most effective strategy for 
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accomplishing their goalS. 51 The onus is on the communicator to make sure that 
the other party understands what is being said.52 Low-context communicators are 
less likely to pick up on hints, particularly if the parties do not know each other 
well. Frank, open communication is perceived as the best way to resolve differ­
ences. 53 It is possible to offer criticism without having the other person take 
offense. 
High Context 
High-context communicators perceive direct requests to be the least effective 
strategy for accomplishing their goals. Directness is often considered rude and 
offensive; hence high-context communicators tend to be tactful, use qualifying 
words, and listen carefully. High-context communicators often hide their true 
feelings in order to maintain harmony in a relationship.54 It is very difficult to 
offer criticism without having the other person take offense.55 Importantly, peo­
ple cannot be separated from the message, which means that reaching agreement 
with someone is completely dependent on liking that person. 
Nature of Persuasion: Factual-Inductive versus Affective 
This dimension refers to the type of evidence negotiators use to develop persua­
sive arguments. After an extensive review of the literature on philosophy, culture, 
and argumentation, we synthesized the variety of persuasive arguments in a bipo­
lar dimension, with factual-inductive and affective as endpoints. 
Factual-Inductive 
Factual-inductive negotiators base their arguments on emfirical facts and use 
linear logic (if-then statements) to persuade the other party. 5 Proof used to sup­
port persuasive arguments includes such things as scientific evidence, professional 
standards, expert opinion, costs, market value, and other hard data. 57 Moreover, 
factual-inductive negotiators believe the strongest case is made by presenting their 
best arguments nrst. 
Affective 
Affective negotiators may base their arguments on abstract theory, ideals,58 
references to status and relationships, and/or appeals to sympathy.59 Evidence 
used to support persuasive arguments includes such things as moral standards, 
equal treatment, tradition, and reciprocity.60 Affective negotiators develop their 
arguments indirectly. They may start with peripheral arguments and present their 
best arguments last, after the other party has reacted. 61 
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Form ofAgreement: Explicit Contract versus Implicit Agreement 
This dimension refers to the preferred form of agreement between the parties: 
either formal written contracts or informal oral agreements. Formal written con­
tracts clearly specify desired partner actions, the degree to which both panies of 
the agreement will cooperate and conform to each other's expectations, as well 
as the penalties that one party can extract should the other party fail to perform. 
Informal agreements often consider the historical and social context of a relation­
ship and acknowledge that the performance and enforcement ofobligations are an 
outcome of mutual interest between panies.62 
Explicit Contract 
Negotiators with this frame favor and expect written, legally binding con­
tracts.63 A written contract records the agreement and definitively specifies what 
64
each party has agreed to do. Consequently, negotiators believe that written 
agreements provide the stability that allows their organization to make invest­
ments and minimize the risk of business 10ss.65 
ImplicitAgreement 
Negotiators with this viewpoint favor broad or vague language in a contract 
because they feel that definitive contract terms are too rigid to allow a good work­
ing relationship to evolve. Particularly with new relationships, negotiators may 
feel that it is impossible to anticipate and document every conceivable contin­
gency. They may also believe that contracts inhibit the parties from exploring 
unexpected or unusual opportunities for improvement and success. Negotiators 
view the contract as a rough guideline, not because they want to evade responsibil­
ity, but because the relationship, not the contract, is primary.66 
USING THE FRAMEWORK IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
Now we return to our opening vignette and consider how the Negotiation Ori­
entations Framework can help us understand the difficulties that Mr. Brown and 
Senor Arroyo are having. Even before the panies enter into discussions, the Selec­
tion of Negotiators emerges as an important factor in understanding possible ten­
sions in their discussion. Sefior Arroyo has been selected because of his influence 
in the company (status), while Mr. Brown has been chosen because of his proven 
performance (ability). Mr. Brown arrives punctually for the meeting and becomes 
impatient at having to wait (monochronic Orientation toward Time); meanwhile 
Senor Arroyo seems unconcerned with the delay (polychronic). Once Mr. Brown 
finally gets a chance to speak with Senor Arroyo, he finds that the conversation 
focuses on nonbusiness matters. For Sefior Arroyo the Most Significant Type of 
Issue to be addressed is whether or not the two panies can develop a good relation­
ship-something he signals by seeking to get to know Mr. Brown on a more 
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personal level. In contrast, Mr. Brown focuses on the task, that is, the details of 
the negotiation. The two also have different orientations regarding Style of Com­
munication, with Mr. Brown talking directly and somewhat informally (low con­
text) while Senor Arroyo adopts a more circumspect and subtle approach (high 
context). 
Within the space of just a few hours, tension points along 4 of the 
12 dimensions have already been identified. It is likely that more will surface as 
the two proceed more deeply into the negotiation process. Whether these tension 
points become minor irritants or major stumbling blocks will depend on several 
factors, including the desire of both negotiators to achieve an agreement, the skill 
of both negotiators at reducing, rather than amplifying tensions, and the ability of 
both negotiators to discriminate between differences in negotiating positions and 
differences in negotiation orientations. The Negotiation Orientations Framework 
is a useful tool in helping negotiators identify tension points that may arise as a 
consequence of cultural differences in orientations. 
Linking Hofstede's Dimensions ofNational Culture to Negotiation 
Orientations 
What accounts for these differences in negotiation tendencies? One of the most 
widely explored explanations is culture; differences in cultural values lead to dif­
ferent negotiating orientations.67 Geert Hofstede identified four work-related 
dimensions of national culture that have been used extensively in cross-cultural 
research, training, and management: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individualism-Collectivism, and Masculinity-Femininity. While research sup­
porting the validity of Hofstede's dimensions is extensive, surprisingly few of 
these studies link them to negotiating orientations. The notion that cultural val­
ues may explain differences in negotiating tendencies led us to explore linkages 
between Hofstede's dimensions and the negotiation orientations in the Weiss 
and Srripp framework. 68 First, we reviewed the research relating Hofstede's 
dimensions to negotiating behaviors and developed hypotheses (Table 10.2) 
based on this review. Next, we conducted a systematic review of prior work on 
the negotiating tendencies found in Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
and the United States and identified the "typical" orientation of negotiators from 
each country on each of the 12 dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations 
Framework. As an example, prior work indicates that U.S. and German negotia­
tors would be selected on the basis of their abilities and that status considerations 
would figure in more heavily in Brazil, Mexico, China, and Japan. Then, we 
developed an ordered ranking of the countries on each negotiating dimension 
and correlated those rankings with country rankings on Hofstede's dimensions. 
Our analysis showed strong correlations for countries with high UAI scores and 
a majority-rule orientation on the Internal Decision Making Process, as well as 
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Table 10.2 
Hypotheses Linking Hofstede's Dimensions of National Culture to Negotiation 
Orientations 
Negotiation Orientation Hofstede Dimension Support for Hypothesis 
1. Basic Concept of Negotiation MAS* None 
2. Most Significant Type of Issue IDV Moderate 
3. Selection of Negotiators PDI None 
4. Influence of Individual Aspirations IDV Moderate 
5. Internal Decision-Making Process UAl Strong 
6. Orientation toward Time UAl Strong 
7. Risk-Taking Propensity DAl Moderate 
8. Basis of Trust UAl Moderate 
9. Concern with Protocol UAl Moderate 
10. Style of Communication IDV Strong 
11. Nature of Persuasion UAl Strong 
12. Form of Agreement UAl Moderate 
*MAS = Masculinity; IDV = Individualism; PDr = Power Distance Index; VAl = Uncertainty 
Avoidance. 
monochronic tendencies on Orientation toward Time. Low DAI scores were 
strongly correlated with a factual-inductive orientation on Nature of Persuasion. 
High scores on IDV were strongly correlated with a low-context Style ofCommu­
nication. Results for the linkages between the other eight negotiation orientations 
in the framework and Hofstede's cultural values were less clear (Table 10.2). 
While theoretical links between cultural values and negotiation orientations can 
be found, our findings suggest that researchers ought to be wary of making infer­
ences about negotiating tendencies on the basis of work-related cultural values. 
Even though managers from countries with high masculinity scores may be more 
competitive,69 this does not necessarily translate to a distributive orientation on 
the Basic Concept of Negotiation. 
Although it may be reasonable to expect a connection between negotiation and 
culture, it is clear from the extensive body of empirical research that national cul­
ture does not account in whole, or even in large part, for differences in negotiation 
orientations. A number of models have been proposed that (1) attempt to capture 
the myriad influences on international negotiating behavior and (2) permit com­
parisons between countries on a set ofdimensions.7o These models focus on what 
individuals do and how culture influences negotiating behavior.?! When sup­
ported by empirical findings, the use of a dimensional framework or model 
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enables meaningful cross-national comparison. Such comparisons are useful to 
negotiators; possible areas of tension can be systematically identified and adjust­
ments in expectations and negotiation behaviors can be made, which increases 
the likelihood of positive outcomes.72 The Salacuse framework, which includes 
ten negotiating tendencies, is the only one of these models that has been empiri­
cally investigated in full. 
The Salacuse Framework: An Alternative Approach that Supports the 
Negotiation Orientations Framework 
To measure the ten negotiating tendencies in his framework, Jeswald W. 
Salacuse developed a survey instrument, which included his ten bipolar dimen­
sions, measured on five-point scales. Respondents were instructed to indicate 
where their own negotiating style and approach in business negotiations fell along 
each of the ten continua. In his 1998 study, Salacuse reported results from a sur­
vey of 191 respondents from 12 countries, finding that nationality did account 
for differences in negotiating tendencies. 73 
In a five-country study, which included nearly 1,200 business people and uni­
versity students with business experience from Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey, 
and the United States, we confirmed the utility of the Salacuse framework 
(Figure 10.2) in identifying country differences in negotiating tendencies?4 Spe­
cific country differences in mean scores were identified using pair-wise tests. For 
Figure 10.2 
Salacwe Dimensions of Cultural Variation in Negotiation 
Negotiation Factors Range of Cultural Responses 
~ 1. Goal Contract • Relationship 
III ~2. Attitudes WinlLose WinlWin 
~3. Personal Styles Informal • Formal 
III ~4. Communications Direct Indirect 
III ~5. Time Sensitivity High Low 
~6. Emotionalism High • Low 
III ~7. Agreement Form Specific General 
~8. Agreement Building Bottom Up III Top Down 
~9. Team Organization One Leader • Consensus 
10. Risk Taking High III ~ Low 
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five of the dimensions-Goal, Attitudes, Personal Styles, Time Sensitivity, and 
Agreement Building-we found significant differences in mean scores on seven 
of the ten paired comparisons. In only one case-Agreement Form-did we £lnd 
no significant differences in mean scores among the five countries. In addition to 
reporting n1ean scores, we looked at the dispersion of responses (intracultural 
variation) within each country. Intracultural variation (ICV), measured by the 
standard deviation, can help capture critical cross-cultural differences. Our 
results showed that ICV for India was consistently larger than the other four 
countries across all ten negotiating tendencies, indicating that widely varying 
tendencies on a given dimension can be found among individual negotiators 
within India. In contrast, ICV for the United States was the smallest among the 
five countries for seven of the ten negotiating tendencies, indicating relatively 
consistent tendencies among individual U.S. negotiators on the majority of 
dimensions. Although each country presented a unique pattern ofnegotiation ori­
entations, not surprisingly, countries were found to be similar on some dimen­
sions. For example, no significant differences were found between pairs of 
countries on agreement form, despite the fact that ICV varied widely. In sum, 
the findings from this study confirmed that cross-national variation in negotiation 
tendencies could be identified using the Salacuse framework. Equally important, 
if not more so, the findings revealed that individuals and groups within cultures 
may be united on some dimensions, deeply divided or split on others, and 
uncommitted on others .. 
While the Salacuse framework was effective in revealing the varied and complex 
nature of negotiation tendencies between and within cultures for several dimen­
sions, it was also useful in revealing tendencies that are contrary to conventional 
wisdom with respect to typical negotiating behaviors in the countries studied. 
For exan1ple, most sources indicate that Mexican and Indian negotiators do not 
expect punctuality and tend to follow a slower pace; Turkish negotiators are punc­
tual, yet also follow a slower pace; and "time is money" for U.S. negotiators.75 Yet 
respondents from Finland, India, Mexico, and Turkey reported a higher sensitiv­
ity toward time than U.S. respondents. Similarly, based on conventional wisdom, 
one would expect Turkish, Indian, and Mexican negotiators to show a tendency 
to communicate indirectly and to prefer relationships over contract. This was 
not the case. Conventional wisdom also did not hold for emotionalism, with 
Finnish and U.S. respondents preferring neither to act emotionally nor to keep 
their emotions under wraps. These findings suggest that negotiators should be 
wary of conventional thinking and prepare differently than "conventional 
wisdom" might suggest. 
Despite the utility of the Salacuse framework, several of the dimensions in the 
framework are not clearly defined. For example, in his discussion of time sensitiv­
ity, Salacuse76 refers to two different concepts: whether negotiators from a given 
country are punctual or late and whether negotiators are quick to make a deal or 
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proceed slowly. To the extent that these are conceptually separable, they should 
be treated as such. The 12 dimensions in the Negotiation Orientations Frame­
work are consistent with the Salacuse dimensions and offer improvements in 
conceptualization. 
The Negotiation Orientations Framework: Not 12 but 24 Dimensions 
With the dimensions of the Negotiation Orientations Framework defined in 
terms ofextant bodies of research, we sought to develop measurement scales that 
could be used to assess tendencies in negotiating behaviors across countries and to 
gather data that would allow comparisons between countries. Descriptions of the 
behaviors exemplifying each pole of each dimension in the Negotiation Orienta­
tions Framework were converted to statements, yielding 71 items, which were 
scored on a five-point Likert scale, with endpoints "strongly agree" and "strongly 
disagree." The resulting Negotiation Orientations Inventory was administered to 
a sample of 1,000 business persons and universiry students with business experi­
ence from Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States. The majority of our 
measures simply did not work as intended. In developing items, we followed the 
literature and carefully included items that reflected both poles ofeach dimension. 
The assumption was that we could reverse code items representing the opposing 
end of a given pole and include them in a scale. Doing so resulted in reliabilities 
well below the criterion we had set. This led us to examine the possibiliry that, 
while the Negotiation Orientations Framework suggested that the ends of a 
dimension (for example, explicit contract versus implicit agreement) could be 
viewed as polar opposites, in practice, people may not think of them as such 
(for example, explicitness and implicitness are independent constructs). Similar 
to the results of individual-level research about individualism and collectivism,77 
most constructs that the negotiation literature treats as bipolar appear to be better 
understood as distinct dimensions. Consequently, we began to think in terms of 
24 negotiating tendencies, rather than 12 dimensions each with two poles, and 
we redefined our indicators and scales accordingly. 
We used the resulting scales and also several single-item indicators to look at 
differences in negotiation orientations across the four countries on the dimensions 
in the Negotiation Orientations Framework.78 We did, indeed, find significant 
differences in negotiating orientations for Finland, Mexico, Turkey, and the 
United States. Moreover, the results revealed that constructs frequently presented 
as bipolar may not be. Rather than demonstrating an orientation toward one pole 
of a continuum to the exclusion of the other, respondents from all four countries 
were often oriented toward both. Similar to our work with the Salacuse dimen­
sions, we found significantly different patterns of response for all four countries 
on most negotiating tendencies. And, once again, we found surprising results on 
a number of dimensions, given the orientations commonly cited in negotiation 
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guides,79 providing additional evidence that conventional wisdom on negotiating 
tendencies may be misleading. 
CONCLUSION 
Cultural differences can complicate, prolong, and even frustrate international 
negotiations. In an ideal world, skilled negotiators would come to the table with 
deep knowledge and familiarity with the culture and negotiation orientations of 
their counterparts; however, the pace and pressures of global business make this 
highly unlikely. Consequently, a framework that focuses on key dimensions of 
the international negotiation context and process can serve as a valuable tool in 
assisting negotiators and researchers alike in identifying potential points of con­
flict. The Negotiation Orientations Framework provides perhaps the most com­
prehensive approach to date for systematic comparison of national cultural 
differences in negotiations. 
Our empirical analyses point to several important conclusions and implica­
tions. First, the results of our work connrm that a dimensional framework is use­
ful for identifying meaningful cross-national comparison. Negotiators can use the 
dimensions in a framework to systematically identify possible areas of tension, 
thereby making it possible to appropriately adjust their expectations and negotia­
tion practices accordingly. 
Second, our work demonstrates that, while cultural values may account for 
some differences in negotiation orientations, it does not wholly account for the 
observed differences between negotiators from different countries. As Weiss 
notes, just as multiple values are most likely to determine behavior, multiple 
behaviors are likely to result from one value. 80 Our nndings suggest that negotia­
tors ought to be wary of making inferences about negotiating tendencies on the 
basis of cultural values alone, because measurements of cultural values are often 
too general and not sufficiently context specinc. 
Third, our experience with designing measures for the Negotiation Orienta­
tions Framework reveals that constructs frequently presented as polar opposites 
should be treated as separate dimensions. Researchers need to think in terms of 
24 separate constructs rather than 12 bipolar dimensions. This suggests a very dif­
ferent approach to measure design than we had anticipated. It also suggests that 
understanding intercultural negotiation is considerably more complex than is 
appreciated in the current intercultural negotiation literature. Thinking in terms 
of24 separate constructs rather than 12 bipolar dimensions also has equally inter­
esting implications for negotiators. Taking Basis of Trust as an example, negotia­
tors should realize that the goals ofa signed contract and ofbuilding a relationship 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that the achievement ofone can lead to 
the other. Moreover, a negotiator who becomes aware of being personally ori­
ented toward both contracts and relationships develops a more nne-grained 
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appreciation of self-awareness, as well as an appreciation that the party across the 
table may hold a similarly complex perspective. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although information on country­
specific negotiating styles may be available, international negotiators ought to 
question conventional wisdom about negotiation stereotypes. Simply stated, con­
ventional wisdom may not be accurate. Again, using Basis ofTrust as an example, 
it is no longer accurate or useful-if it ever was-for a U.S. negotiator to expect a 
Mexican counterpart to be solely relationship oriented or a U.S. compatriot to be 
solely contract oriented. 
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